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Foreword
Missing Information: The Scientific Data Gap in
Conservation and Chemical Regulation
JOHN S. APPLEGATE* & ROBERT L. FiscHMAN**
Scientific information has become a central rationale for environmental regulation,
and scientific uncertainty is viewed as a major obstacle in developing, justifying, and
enforcing environmental laws and policies. In the context of environmental regulation,
scientific information may be analyzed as subject to both supply and demand. A
regulatory system that supplies more scientific information than it demands can
operate effectively to impose protective regulation. By contrast, a system that demands
more information than it supplies willface a "data gap "and willfail to accomplish its
protective goals. The data gap can be addressed by applying regulatory techniques
that increase the supply of data by providing more information ('filling" the gap) or
that reduce the demand by permitting regulation to proceed despite uncertainty and
incomplete information ("bridging" the gap).
Environmental law is also structured by the divide between pollution control and
chemical regulation on the one hand, and resource management on the other. In
addressing the data gap, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish not only between
supply and demand, but also between chemical and conservation issues. The existence
of a data gap between the scientific information necessary for effective environmental
regulation and the information available to regulators and the public presents an
opportunity to study the causes and extent of the differences in the chemical and
conservation regulatory systems.
Environmental regulation is science-based regulation.' The federal agencies that
adopt environmental regulations rarely justify them by reference to economic goals or
to social or moral values, though these clearly play an important role. Rather, for
reasons having to do with regulatory effectiveness, administrative professionalism,
historical development, and political manipulation, scientific information has become
the indispensable-if not always the true or only 2-rationale for environmental
* Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Walter W. Foskett Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Applegate is also a member-scholar of
the Center for Progressive Reform, which co-sponsored this symposium. Thanks to Jay
Hamilton and Wendy Wagner for very helpful ideas.
** Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. The authors thank the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington and
the Center for Progressive Reform for co-sponsoring this symposium.
1. "Science," for these purposes, refers to the physical, including the health, sciences.
2. See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1255 (2004) (detailing a regulatory action in which
the authors argue that such a charade occurred); Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense:
Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005);
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613
(1995) (suggesting that non-scientific considerations are often at work, despite the nominal
reliance on scientific rationales).
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regulations. 3 As a result, the discussion of scientific uncertainty is an element of nearly
every text on environmental law. Scientific uncertainty is viewed, quite correctly, as
one of the obstacles, if not the obstacle, that environmental regulators must overcome
in developing sensible and effective laws and policies, in justifying them before the
courts and the political branches of government, and in enforcing them.
Some scientific uncertainty is intractable. Because of limitations in our
understanding of the physical world around us or the vast resources that would be
required to obtain such an understanding, we will rarely know precise answers in
advance of taking regulatory action to protect human health and the environment.
Therefore, we must either accept uncertainty, not regulate at all (or regulate only with
the consent of the regulated, which amounts to the same thing), or tolerate a number of
regulatory pathologies designed to obfuscate the lack of scientific certainty.4 The
intractable form of scientific uncertainty-"knowledge uncertainty," as Professor
Howard Latin put it5-is most frequently what the environmental law texts refer to,
because intractability establishes uncertainty as a central, inherent characteristic of
environmental regulation, which environmental law and policy must somehow
manage. 6 Thus, for example, the increasingly influential precautionary principle in
international environmental law is a forthright effort to acknowledge uncertainty
without forgoing environmental protection, by permitting regulatory action in advance
of full information.7
3. John S. Applegate, Introduction to 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN
ENvIRONmENTAL LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (John S. Applegate, ed. 2004), at xiii-xxiv; see
also Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural
Resource Regulation, 26 PuB. LAND & REsouRcEs L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) ("Science has been seen
both as the justification for environmental law and as the means for fairly administering it.");
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 569-75 (1992) (describing the "allure" of science).
4. These are most frequently referred to by Professor Wendy Wagner's felicitous phrase,
the "science charade." See Wagner, supra note 2. Other examples are collected in Stephanie
Tai, Three Asymmetries ofInformedEnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 78 TEMp. L. REv. 659,661
n.7, 682-84 (2005).
5. Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal
Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 356-57 (1982).
6. This has been a continuing theme throughout the history of environmental law. See,
e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703,745-47 (2000) (listing "uncertainty and risk," as well as
other characteristics that also contribute to uncertainty such as physically and temporally distant
injury); Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
207, 208-09 (1978) (describing "ignorance of mechanism" as exemplifying "the uncertainties
surrounding environmental risk decisionmaking").
7. The most common formulation of the precautionary principle can be found in the Rio
Declaration: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development [UNCED], Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 15 1/5/Rev. 1
(June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879; see also John S. Applegate, The Taming of the
Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 13 (2002) (providing
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There is another, equally important kind of scientific uncertainty, however. It is the
absence of scientific data which could feasibly (which is not to say cheaply or rapidly)
be obtained. Latin calls this "information uncertainty," and it is a distinctly tractable
problem.8 It affects, for example, basic toxicology information, chemical exposure
pathways, and observational data of many kinds. Since such data are available or could
feasibly be generated, their absence must be accounted a choice, rather than an
inherent quality, of environmental law. This information is absent because
environmental law has, for a variety of reasons, established a regulatory regime in
which the information needs of regulation outstrip the available information.
The absence of such information-the "data gap"-in the environmental regulation
of chemicals was the subject of considerable academic discussion in the early 1990s.
9
Interest in this problem has recently intensified l as a consequence of two recent
developments. First, in connection with the adoption of the new European Union
legislation to regulate industrial chemicals, a great deal of attention has focused on
studies in Europe and the United States that demonstrate, remarkably uniformly, that
there is a large deficit of even basic toxicity information about most commercial
chemicals." Second, in the last few years, Congress has adopted legislation designed,
more or less transparently, to restrict the information available to support
environmental regulation without at the same time moderating the information
requirements for regulatory action. 12 This legislation, the Data Access Act and the
Information Quality Act, offers regulated entities additional and more extensive
opportunities than ever before to challenge or cast doubt on the scientific basis for
agency action, indeed, on practically any science publicly used by any federal agency.
In contrast, the procedures and results of cost-benefit analysis, for example, are not
covered by this legislation. The legislation further intensifies the indispensability of
science in the environmental regulatory process both directly, by adding substantial
commentary on the purposes and elements of the precautionary principle).
8. Latin, supra note 5, at 356 (emphasis omitted); see also Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing
Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 777-90 (1997)
(discussing "preventable scientific uncertainties").
9. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Perils ofUnreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1991); Mary Lyndon,
Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87
MICH. L. REv. 1795 (1989).
10. See, e.g., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds.,
2006); David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 ENVTL. L.
Rr. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10232 (2002); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE
L.J. 1619 (2004) [hereinafter Wagner, Commons Ignorance].
11. See John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research: Who Should
Bridge the Data Gap in Chemical Regulation?, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLrTICS, supra note
10, at 255, 263-64. A different perspective, emphasizing the amount of information that is
available, can be found in James W. Conrad, Jr., Open Secrets: The Widespread Availability of
Information About the Health and Environmental Effects of Chemicals, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 141 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Data Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495 (1998)
(enacted as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999; also known as the Shelby Amendment); Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2000) (enacted as a rider to the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act, 2001).
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time and process to the technical analysis of regulatory action, and indirectly, by
reinforcing the centrality of scientific information to the regulatory enterprise. The
information legislation confirms, as never before, that the existence and extent of
scientific information is often the most difficult hurdle that a robust program of
protective environmental legislation must surmount. Therefore, explicit attention to the
use of scientific information in environmental law and policy is of critical importance.
In the context of an environmental regulatory system, scientific information can be
analyzed as subject to both supply and demand. Some aspects of regulatory regimes
demand information to support governmental action, and other aspects supply
information to the regulator. For example, the "substantial evidence" of a chemical's
carcinogenic potency under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 13 imposes
substantial demands for scientific information, which TSCA's testing and adverse
effect reporting provisions only partially supply. As presently structured, therefore,
TSCA's information needs outstrip the information available to the agency, creating a
data gap, and resulting in a seemingly dormant program of chemical regulation.
Generalizing from the TSCA example, an environmental regulatory program can be
described by its balance of demand for and supply of scientific information. Moreover,
the individual regulatory choices or techniques that constitute regulatory programs can
be characterized by their contributions to the supply and demand of scientific
information, as follows 14:
Demand Supply
Increases demand Decreases supply
Risk-based regulation Declining public R&D funding
Aggressively skeptical judicial review "Sound science" demands
Burden of proof on government Data Quality Act
OMB intervention Politicized peer review
Legal incentives for ignorance
Decreases demand Increases supply
Technology-based standards Increased R&D funding
Burden of proof on polluters Coherent, targeted R&D plans
Hazard-based regulation (Prop. 65) Collections of data
Legislative listing of chemicals Licensing, burden of proof on polluters
Precautionary principle Test rules and testing requirements
A regulatory system that supplies more than it demands will be able to operate
effectively to impose protective regulation. A system that demands more than it
supplies will encounter a data gap, as does TSCA, and will fail to accomplish its
protective goals.
The above schema illustrates not only the potential gap between supply and
demand, but also the potential devices for addressing the data gap. To extend the "gap"
metaphor, the data gap can be either "filled" or "bridged" by applying regulatory
techniques. Filling involves increasing the supply of data by providing more
information, while bridging refers to reducing the demand by permitting regulation to
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); see Applegate, supra note 9; Wendy E. Wagner, The
Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HuM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK
AssEssMENT 459 (2000) (suggesting that TSCA embodies an "unprecautionary principle").
14. See Applegate, supra note 11, at 261-75.
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proceed despite residual uncertainty. TSCA adopts a filling strategy: "It is the policy of
the United States that ... adequate data should be developed with respect to the effect
of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the environment,"'15 and other
provisions of the statute provide some tools to implement that strategy.' 6 In other
statutes, a licensing requirement, as for prescription drugs or pesticides, is intended to
generate sufficient information to make a safety determination concerning the object of
regulation. 17
By comparison, statutes that mandate bans or phase-outs (for example, TSCA's
treatment of PCBs' 8) or technology-based regulatory standards (for example, the post-
1990 system for hazardous air pollutants 19) adopt a bridging strategy. Because they
select standards that can be translated into regulatory restrictions with relatively little
new information, the precautionary principle is a bridging strategy, which "can be
defended as a pragmatic decisionmaking heuristic that is particularly well-suited to the
task of fostering consideration of how best to safeguard life and the environment under
conditions of uncertainty and ignorance." 20 That is, the precautionary principle permits
restrictions to go forward with less than complete information.2'
In addition to the choice of regulatory devices, the differences between scientific
and regulatory-legal norms of knowledge exacerbate the data gap in environmental
policy.2 2 The scientific model of endless questioning has served our society
extraordinarily well as an engine for advancing knowledge, but this model is ill
suited-and was not intended-to be the engine for protecting human health and the
environment in the face of an extremely complex and imperfectly understood reality.
By failing (mistakenly or manipulatively) to recognize the distinct purposes of
scientific inquiry, opponents of protective regulation can encourage a regulatory
system whose demands for scientific information are nearly infinite while the supply
remains static. In other words, the level of importance of scientific information in
supporting environmental regulation is not, as anti-regulatory rhetoric of the "sound
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). The policy continues, "and that the development of such data
should be the responsibility of those who manufacture... such chemical[s] ...." Id.
16. For example, the EPA is authorized to issue "test rules" that require manufacturers to
generate test data. § 2603. Also, manufacturers must report adverse effects data. § 2607; see
Applegate, supra note 9, at 315; Conrad, supra note 11, at 143-46. The effectiveness of these
devices has been questioned, however. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17. See Applegate, supra note 9, at 308-12 (comparing data availability for licensing and
non-licensing systems).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e). TSCA was enacted shortly after it was learned that PCBs-
polychlorinated biphenyls, fire retardant chemicals frequently used in large electrical
equipment-were potential carcinogens.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2000).
20. Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs, 22 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2007).
21. Some versions of the precautionary principle require that the authority invoking the
principle will continue to seek to reduce the uncertainty, which muddies the classification
somewhat. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at
20-21, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000).
22. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 2, at 253-57; Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 3, at 17-
20; Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 89 (1988); Tai, supra note 4, at 666-69.
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science" variety would have it, 23 a self-evident matter of truth and justice. Instead, the
role of science is the direct result of legislative, administrative, and judicial choices
that mandate the demand for and supply of scientific information.
Moreover, these choices are necessarily overlaid on patterns of asymmetric access
to reliable scientific information and the ability to generate that information. As
Professors Wagner, Tai, and others have demonstrated, "privately held information can
constitute a costly barrier-sometimes an insurmountable one-to regulating product
and related industrial risks." 24 Thus, information provisions that are relatively
ineffective at obtaining or generating such information perpetuate an asymmetry which
frustrates effective regulation. While it is possible that the information requirements in
environmental statutes have been enacted without regard to their effect on these
asymmetries, it has been widely recognized since the "McNollgast" papers that
political actors quite deliberately exploit procedural requirements to assure or frustrate
particular decisions by regulatory agencies:
[Blecause policy decisions depend on what information is available to the agency,
structure and process determine the quantity, quality, and completeness of
available information and the extent to which policy decisions must be supported
by this information. Political principals can control the influence of a constituency
by using structure and process to affect the dependence of the agency on
information the constituency supplies.
An agency that has sufficient resources to generate its own information about
the consequences of its decisions, available funds to subsidize the participation in
its processes of various poorly organized interests, and a relatively lenient
standard for judicial review of its actions (for example, arbitrary and capricious),
will be far less dependent on highly organized, well-represented interests than an
agency that lacks resources and faces a high standard for upholding its decisions in
Court. 25
Information requirements are thus not only choices, but choices with substantial and
predictable practical consequences.26 In sum, information policies and requirements
23. Some scholars offer trenchant critiques of "sound science" rhetoric. See, e.g., Thomas
0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based
Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and
Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 897 (2004).
24. Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEo. L.J. 693, 697 (2007); see also Tai, supra note 4, at 686-98; Wagner,
Commons Ignorance, supra note 10.
25. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA.
L. REv. 431, 440-41 (1989); see also id. at 469 ("More elaborate procedures are generally
regarded as favorable to regulated industries. Because industries possess much of the
information relevant to regulatory decisions, elaborate processes give them more power by
increasing the importance of that information."); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPolitical Control, 3 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 243, 268-69 (1987) (offering TSCA as an example); Tai, supra note 4, at 698-709
(criticizing the Information Quality Act).
26. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's
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have the capacity to further or to frustrate the protection of human health and the
environment as implemented by environmental regulation.
Along with scientific uncertainty, the divide in environmental law between
pollution control and resource management is a pervasive attribute of the standard
structuring of the field. It is commonplace for teachers of environmental law courses
and authors of environmental law casebooks to separate the conservation (endangered
species, ecosystem management, and land and resource use) and the chemical (air and
water pollution, toxic substances and hazardous wastes) aspects of environmental law.
Indeed, the two areas are routinely confined to different courses and books. As both a
cause and effect of this division, the conservation and chemical aspects of
environmental law have surprisingly few points of intersection and are analytically
very separate.27
The division is not, of course, simply arbitrary; there are real differences. The most
obvious is scale: conservation regulation generally concerns itself with ecosystems and
the wildlife within them; chemical regulation concerns itself primarily with health and
the threats posed to it, often at the cellular and molecular level, by chemical agents of
various kinds. A further difference is the object of statutory concern: for conservation
regulation, it is primarily non-human species, and even inanimate objects like land
forms; for chemical regulation, it is overwhelmingly human health, usually with only a
perfunctory nod at other aspects of the environment. Moreover, while both chemical
and conservation law focus on harm avoidance (to human health and ecosystems,
respectively) primarily through negative commands, only conservation regulation
focuses on the management of resources, through positive commands, to enhance their
value.
While the data gap, as such, has most frequently been observed and theorized in the
chemical setting, it is by no means limited to chemicals. It is a fundamental problem on
the conservation side of the house, as well.28 Indeed, one need go no further than Aldo
Leopold's germinal work on conservation to find concern with the data gap for species,
ecosystems, and habitats. Lack of scientific knowledge about ecosystems led to
Leopold's famous aphorism, "To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of
intelligent tinkering." 29 Thus, in thinking about information needs, we must distinguish
not only between supply and demand, scientific and regulatory-legal norms, and
asymmetric access to information, but also between chemical and conservation issues.
The information needs of land management are as likely to be distinct from the needs
of regulation, as ecosystems are distinct from chemicals--or so we hypothesize. The
contributors to this symposium will assess these differences in their articles.
The symposium that follows thus explores two familiar but insufficiently analyzed
aspects of environmental regulation: the needs for scientific information that are
created and satisfied by regulatory systems, and the disjunction between the regulatory
Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004).
27. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park
Establishment Legislation and its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENy. U.L. REv.
779 (1997); Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands IL Air Pollution Law, 12
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POE'Y 1 (1993). But see Lazarus, supra note 6, (describing characteristics
common to all of environmental law).
28. See Kristin Carden, Note, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species
Conservation Law, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 165 (2006); Doremus, supra note 26.
29. ALDO LEOPOLD, RouND RIVER 147 (Luna B. Leopold ed., 1953).
2008]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
systems for the chemical and conservation areas of environmental law. The continuing
existence of a severe data gap between the scientific information required for effective
regulation and the information available to regulators and the public provides a
valuable opportunity to uncover the causes and extent of the respective data gaps. The
data gap also permits us to study in a concrete setting the differences between chemical
and conservation regulatory regimes, and to use insights from each area to improve
regulation in both. The objectives of the symposium, therefore, are to bring together
established experts in the conservation and chemical areas of environmental regulation
to describe the nature, sources, and extent of the data gaps in their respective areas; to
seek commonalities among areas; and, by learning from both areas, to propose
regulatory reforms to fill or bridge the data gap.
The contributions to the symposium are organized into three overlapping groups.
The first considers supply and addresses several key questions: How does the law
generate the information that it requires? What legal tools are available, and how well
are they deployed? What institutional capacities exist for generating information?
Where is the relevant scientific expertise located? These articles include those of
Professor Holly Doremus on the "information pipeline" in natural resource
management, Professor Robert Glicksman on the use of models in U.S. Forest Service
planning, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service experts Teresa Woods and Steve Morey
on the Endangered Species Act.
The demand group includes articles by Professor Alyson Flournoy on wetlands
permitting under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and by Professor William
Buzbee on "adjudicatory triggers" in the context of the ill-fated Westway project in
New York City. They ask: How does the law create the need for scientific
information? What are the statutory/legal objectives (harm avoidance, value
enhancement) of the various types of environmental protection? What are the
uncertainties that each form of environmental protection encounters? How do legal and
scientific information needs differ?
The last group of articles considers information regulation and legal systems that
address data needs directly. How have generally applicable requirements like the
Information Quality Act been used in the chemical and conservation areas of
environmental protection? Have information requirements had an important impact on
substantive implementation of environmental law? How should we measure whether
an information demand is constructive or counter-productive in environmental law?
Professor Carl Cranor describes the informational consequences of California's
landmark antitoxics referendum, Proposition 65, and Professor Wendy Wagner is
concerned with the use of private parties to regulate the quality of information used in
public environmental regulation. Finally, Professor Fischman explores other
dimensions besides subject matter (i.e., pollution control or resource management)
along which to divide environmental law. This reveals certain information policy
affinities otherwise obscured by the subject matter divide. He illustrates this point by
showing how the EPA pollution control permit programs can offer a model for
improving the implementation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, which
prohibits significant habitat modification under certain circumstances.
We invite you to consider these articles, both individually as contributions to an
important and ongoing debate on the importance of information in environmental
regulation, and collectively as a serious effort to illuminate the commonalities and
differences in conservation and chemical environmental law.
[Vol. 83:399
